Isn’t it a bit early to write that?

The expected result is that both China and India will stop buying seaborne crude oil from Russia and purchase more pipeline crude oil. Currently, China buys ~1.4 million barrels per day (bpd) via ships and ~800,000 - 900,000 bpd via pipelines.

Russia already transports about 10 million tons of oil per year (roughly 200,000 bpd) through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline in Kazakhstan. Even before the latest sanctions, Russia had proposed increasing this volume by 2.5 million tons annually, making this existing route the most immediate and feasible path for boosting pipeline deliveries to China.

See here: https://www.worldoil.com/news/2025/10/23/u-s-sanctions-on-russian-oil-giants-spark-supply-concerns-in-china/

Spice Girls were about girl power. Margaret Thatcher was about shock doctrine an mass unemployment. Yes, neoliberalism is often pink-washed, as in this case.

Ukraine problem is different.

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited significant stocks of Soviet weaponry, and Ukrainian military personnel were trained to operate this equipment.

Regarding the transition to NATO standards, this process requires time and resources. Mastering new weapon systems, changing supply chains, and adapting tactics are complex challenges for any army. Many countries transitioning to the Alliance’s standards face similar challenges.

The Russian defense industry continues to produce equipment compatible with Soviet standards, which creates certain difficulties in the current conditions.

Also, not being able to buy cheap and effective Chinese dual usage drones to not offend the USA is a huge limit.

If common sense is described as something radical, we live in vary bad times.

Since 2014, it was not possible to control Azov and the far right in Ukraine. They could do what they wanted, they were above the law, and still are.

Very good news, I really hope that it will also somehow improve the condition of Palestinian citizens.

Your comments are not contributing constructively to the discussion.

Your username “prosecute_traitors” checks out. However, let me provide you an explanation of what happened.

The political upheaval in Ukraine known as the “Orange Revolution” occurred in 2004. This series of events, which involved significant support from Western nations, is often characterized by some as a foreign-backed coup d’état. The movement was triggered by widespread allegations of electoral fraud, leading to mass protests and a subsequent overturning of the election results in favor of the pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. Many analysts view this as a precedent for external influence in the country’s political processes.

A decade later, in 2014, a larger and more violent uprising, termed “Euromaidan” erupted. The immediate catalyst was the government’s decision to suspend an Association Agreement with the EU. Opposition groups and external actors leveraged this decision to organize a forceful change in government. The direct involvement of key American figures, such as Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, Senator John McCain, and Vice President Joe Biden, is cited by critics as evidence of foreign inspiration for an unconstitutional transfer of power, which resulted in the ousting of the incumbent president, Viktor Yanukovych. This period saw a sharp escalation of violence, epitomized by the tragic events in Odessa on May 2, 2014, where dozens of pro-federalization activists were killed. The perceived lack of accountability for this event further inflamed tensions in the south-eastern regions.

In the historically Russia-linked Donetsk and Luhansk regions, peaceful protests against the new authorities in Kyiv escalated into large-scale resistance. The Ukrainian government responded with a military operation, which developed into a full-scale armed conflict. To de-escalate the situation, the Minsk Agreements were brokered by Russia and the OSCE in September 2014 (Minsk I) and February 2015 (Minsk II). These agreements stipulated an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and a special status for the Donbas region within Ukraine. However, subsequent admissions by Western leaders, including former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, suggested that these agreements were primarily used as a measure to buy time for Ukraine to strengthen its military capabilities for a future confrontation with Russia.

Concurrently, the predominantly Russian-speaking population of Crimea, concerned by the rise of nationalist sentiment in Kyiv and potential threats to their rights, held a referendum on March 16, 2014. Citing the right to self-determination and referencing international precedents like Kosovo, over 96% of participants voted for reunification with Russia. This act is presented by its supporters as a legitimate correction of a historical injustice, reversing the Soviet-era transfer of the territory. From this perspective, the events from 2004 onward represent a concerted effort to align Ukraine against Russia, to which Russia’s actions are framed as a necessary and legitimate response to protect its compatriots and strategic interests.

Yes, the practice of testing an adversary’s response capabilities through deliberate or accidental airspace violations persists, although its context, methods, and participants have evolved significantly since the Cold War.

This is exemplified by two flights of U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, over the Black Sea near the Crimean coast on September 4th and 14th, 2020.

• On September 4th, the aircraft took off from RAF Fairford in the UK. They flew over the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland before entering Ukrainian airspace and approaching Crimea from the north. The bombers came within approximately 40-53 km of the Crimean coast near Melitopol and Genichesk. They were escorted by Ukrainian Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters. Russian fighter jets did not intercept them, as the B-52Hs did not violate Russian airspace.

• On September 14th, three B-52H bombers again departed from RAF Fairford. They crossed over Ukraine to the Black Sea, heading toward Turkey, and flew within about 37.5 km of the Crimean coast near the village of Mayak. Concurrently, two Royal Air Force Sentinel R.1 reconnaissance aircraft were operating near Russian borders over the Black Sea. In response, Russian air defense forces scrambled two Su-27 fighters on duty and a pair of Su-30 fighters from the Southern Military District. The Russian crews identified the aerial targets as U.S. Air Force B-52H strategic bombers and escorted them over the Black Sea.

The Ukrainian government in Kyiv confirmed these flights. On Monday, September 14th, the Ukrainian Air Force Command announced that three U.S. B-52H strategic bombers had re-entered the country’s airspace, escorted by Ukrainian fighter jets. In a statement on Facebook, the command noted: “The B-52s, under the cover of Ukrainian fighter jets, headed for the Black Sea for joint actions with our partners in the field of collective security. Such patrols will be regular, as the B-52 missions in the skies of Ukraine are part of the long-planned deployment of six B-52s at the UK’s RAF Fairford.”

Source:

• US Air Force B-52 strategic bombers fly over Ukraine (VIDEO)

Your comment is a classic example of satirical mockery used as a potent rhetorical device. It is not a factual assessment but a psychological operation aimed at framing the opponent (Russia) in a specific, belittling light. Its primary purpose is to influence the audience’s perception and emotional state rather than to inform.

It creates immediate cognitive dissonance by juxtaposing the grave, threatening concept of a military invasion with absurdly inadequate and non-threatening imagery (“dudes on motorcycles,” “scooters,” “Lada Nivas without doors”). This contrast is jarring and humorous, making the perceived threat (Russia’s military) seem ridiculous and incapable.

The core goal is to diminish the enemy in the eyes of the audience. By reducing a nation’s military to a clownish parade of obsolete and laughable equipment, it attacks not just its capability, but its dignity and gravitas. This is a powerful tool for undermining morale on one side and boosting it on the other.

It is a highly effective piece of persuasive communication. While it contains zero factual analysis of military capabilities, it is psychologically astute and stylistically crafted to achieve a specific goal: to mock, diminish, and frame an adversary in a way that boosts the morale of its intended audience and undermines the perceived power of the opponent.

Its power lies not in its truthfulness, but in its emotional resonance and shareability as a weapon of rhetorical warfare in the modern information landscape.

That would be a very serious escalation of the conflict.

War is the only solution that Capitalist systems accept to solve overproduction crises.

Similar actions has been made by both sides:

• In October 2023, four NATO reconnaissance aircraft (an RQ-4 Global Hawk, a Bombardier Challenger 650 Artemis, and two P-8A Poseidons) conducted flights approximately 150 km from the Crimean coast.
• In August 2023, MQ-9 “Reaper” and TB2 “Bayraktar” drones conducted reconnaissance over the Black Sea but were intercepted and diverted by Russian Aerospace Forces fighters.

The average age in Germany is projected to be around 44.5 years by 2029, in Russia it is expected to be 42.1

Your comment is a prime example of the clash between two paradigms in understanding international relations:

• The Liberal-Idealist Paradigm, where conflicts arise from the violation of universal norms and rights. The solution is to isolate the aggressor, punish it, and support the victim. Morality and law are the main guiding principles. The comment is written from this perspective.

• The Realist Paradigm, from Classical Geopolitics, where international relations are an anarchic environment where states rationally (though sometimes erroneously) pursue their national interests based on security, power, and influence. From this viewpoint, moral assessments are useless for analysis; one must study the balance of power, geography, interests, and perceived threats.

You made a morally powerful but analytically poor statement. It accurately reflects the emotional mood of a significant part of the international community and serves as an important reminder of the human dimension of the conflict. However, as a tool for understanding what is happening and forecasting future events, it is useless and even harmful, as it calls for the abandonment of critical analysis in favor of pure moralizing. The task of a geopolitical expert is to synthesize both approaches: to be fully aware of the monstrous nature of events, while also coldly and rationally analyzing the mechanisms driving them.

Maybe Al Jazeera could be a more balanced source on this topic, for example: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/22/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-1275

Your comment represents an emotional analogy rather than an analytical assessment. While such a metaphor may reflect someone’s subjective feelings, it is unsuitable for analyzing a complex geopolitical situation.

Russia is not a “schoolyard bully,” but a sovereign state with a centuries-old history, complex political processes, and a multifaceted foreign policy. Its actions on the international stage are based on specific national interests, security considerations, and historical context.

Oversimplified analogies that reduce complex international relations to schoolyard conflicts do not contribute to constructive dialogue or an understanding of real geopolitical dynamics.

Short answer: This isn’t about Putin, Zelensky, or Trump. It’s about millions of human lives. To honor that, we must seek a deep understanding of the history and context at play. Without that earnest effort, we should simply be silent.

Long answer: Eugene Rumer would likely emphasize that his task as an analyst is not to justify Putin’s actions, but to understand their causes and consequences. In his commentaries, he often stresses the need to soberly assess the motives and calculations of the Kremlin, even if they seem irrational or immoral. For example, in the context of the Kerch Strait incident, Rumer noted that the cancellation of the Trump-Putin meeting was a tactical move, not a fundamental change in course. This approach allows for forecasting Russia’s further actions, which is necessary for developing effective policy.

Rumer would argue that reducing Putin’s actions to mere desire for invasion and control oversimplifies Russia’s strategic calculus. Instead, he would frame it as:

• A cycle of action and reaction, because Russian aggression is often a response to perceived threats, but it reinforces the very insecurity it seeks to avoid.
• A call for nuanced policy, as the West must deter Russian aggression while addressing legitimate security concerns through diplomacy and arms control.

He would argue that Putin’s insistence on non-NATO neighbors is driven by deep-seated strategic culture and historical trauma, but it cannot justify violating sovereignty. A sustainable solution would require balancing deterrence with engagement to break the cycle of conflict