Emilia Belknap and Stuart Turnbull-Dugarte explain their analysis on the demographics of Reform UK voters in the UK. They argue that while the dominant narrative is that young men are the most likely to turn to the party, the evidence does not support this.

Much ink has been spilled exploring the rise of the far right across liberal democracies. Britain, like much of the rest of Western Europe, now plays host to an electorally successful far-right party in the form of Reform UK.

A robust cross-national body of evidence has identified a significant gender gap in support for far-right parties. Evidence also points towards the expansion of this gap, with young men in particular identified as an important and increasing constituency of far-right parties. Has Britain too fallen victim to the emergence of a gender-youth gap in support for the far right?

Media commentary would suggest that it has, with diverse sources on the political left and right jumping at the opportunity to comment that “Britain’s white working-class young men are flocking to Reform” or explain “why young British men are drawn to Reform”. But these claims are fundamentally flawed, and represent a systematic mischaracterisation of the typical voting preferences of young people, in particular young men.

Popular commentary around young men’s support for the far-right should be tempered in two ways. First, evidence of differential support between men and women is commonly interpreted as indicative of absolute support or the far right among men. This is incorrect: a large majority of British men do not support the far right. Second, there is no evidence, at least in the specific case of Britain, that the gender differential is conditionally different among individuals of different age groups. In other words, across all ages, men are more likely than women to support Reform UK.