I do not see any double standards on my part, can you explain quite clearly what they are?
Yes, of course I can explain.
As we know: The primary cause of the rift between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev lay in the policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist nations—a course Khrushchev proclaimed at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956. Mao Zedong viewed this policy as a departure from Marxism-Leninism and a betrayal of the global revolution, which led to deep ideological and geopolitical disagreements.
As we know: Deng adopted a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West in the 1970s…
Do you not see the contradiction here, Comrade? If that is the case, then China and the USSR ought to reconcile, since their policies are identical. As we recall, the 1970s saw a period of “détente” between the USSR and the USA.
Incidentally, it was when Khrushchev pivoted toward the West that the USSR became hooked on the “oil needle”—a dependency it still hasn’t managed to kick…
The monetary reform of 1961 was carried out in order to peg the ruble to the dollar.
Later Mao made more mistakes than earlier Mao.
I would be very surprised, Comrade, if you said otherwise.
I met a Chinese guy on Reddit whose father fled to the U.S. during the Cultural Revolution.
But it probably wasn’t any worse—because fewer people actually died during the Cultural Revolution; the events there consisted mostly of unprecedented repression.
This is why the Gang of Four took power
I think the “Gang of Four” affair was Deng clearing his own path to power. The internal political struggle at the time was extremely fierce.
Did you see the news footage of that trial?
There was one woman among the defendants—I don’t recall her name, though she was a close associate of Mao—and for some reason, I felt sorry for her. When she delivered her final statement in court, it struck me that only a true communist facing execution could speak like that…
Reform and Opening Up ultimately was done in a manner that the US thought they could exploit, but in reality the CPC maintained control and the US Empire’s plans are failing. This is why the cold war against China is ramping up.
Let’s put it this way: China outmaneuvered the U.S. The U.S. underestimated China’s strength. This is what we have come to call the “Chinese Miracle.” Americans are pragmatists; they don’t believe in miracles… :))))
It is just like how the West slept on the USSR back in the 1930s… they, too, refused to believe in a miracle at the time.
However, I believe that comparing these two miracles is somewhat inappropriate. As you rightly noted, the conditions under which these goals were achieved were quite different.
I believe you are mistaken, comrade. I am not actually Nikita Khrushchev nor am I Mao Zedong. Any “double-standard” you see with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up as a result of problems with the late Mao era and the Gang of Four must be considered from that context, and not merely from one aspect of Mao’s critique of Khrushchev’s policy before the Gang of Four era.
Regarding the Gang of Four, they were largely an extension of Mao’s incorrect lines towards the end of his life, without most of his positive lines. Deng Xiaoping corrected the course for the new era of development, having inherited a basically industrialized economy but with widespread poverty and backwards technology.
As for China outmaneuvering the west, I agree. This is pretty plainly what happened, despite what the west thought they could get away with, China maintained a dictatorship of the proletariat and maintained political control in the socialist market economy.
Any “double-standard” you see with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up as a result of problems with the late Mao era
You’ve probably misunderstood me again, Comrade.
What you call Deng Xiaoping’s “openness,” Mao called Khrushchev’s “revisionism.”
Deng did exactly what Khrushchev had attempted to do—only later. Or do you consider it a mistake on Mao’s part that he didn’t beat Khrushchev to the punch and establish relations with the West first?
Regarding the Gang of Four, they were largely an extension of Mao’s incorrect lines towards the end of his life, without most of his positive lines. Deng Xiaoping corrected the course for the new era of development, having inherited a basically industrialized economy but with widespread poverty and backwards technology.
I don’t understand why you—a man with the mindset of a dialectical materialist—are always prone to idealizing things. It is still a Party, and the same internal Party struggle is at play.
Let me tell you how it all unfolded in the USSR. When Gorbachev came to power and launched Perestroika, a great many members of the Central Committee were opposed to it. This was the so-called “Old Guard”—or, if you prefer, you could call them the “Gang of Four.” These were Brezhnev’s people. Within a very short timeframe—and very quietly—these individuals were either removed from their posts or sidelined for one reason or another; some were compromised and forced to step down. It wasn’t as loud, brutal, or theatrical as the affair involving the original “Gang of Four,” but the result was the same: the entire Old Guard—that “Gang of Four”—simply dissolved into the ether of existence…
To suggest that the “Great Helmsman” Deng was thinking about the people or about reforms back then—much as Gorbachev supposedly was during Perestroika while simultaneously purging his rivals—is, at the very least, naive, Comrade! At that time, they were thinking about one thing and one thing only: power.
And I recently told you something untrue. Gorbachev did have a plan. It was the “Acceleration” plan—a concept originally conceived by Andropov. Andropov had entrusted its development to three individuals: Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and… well, I’ve forgotten the third one. This “Acceleration” plan concerned exclusively economic reforms—there were absolutely no political or ideological components to it!
Over the course of two years—largely thanks to Ryzhkov—the plan was fully developed, and in 1985, Gorbachev officially launched it. He immediately presented it during the very first plenary session of the Central Committee. It was Andropov’s “Acceleration” plan.
It was a plan for economic reforms!
Then, in 1987—when Perestroika truly began (that is, when the term Perestroika first started appearing in the newspapers)—the scope of the reforms expanded to encompass not only economic matters but also state-level and ideological issues. Ryzhkov opposed this expansion and subsequently resigned. This comes from the memoirs of Ryzhkov himself, who passed away not long ago.
Yakovlev—who at the time served as the USSR’s chief ideologue—bears the entire blame. It was he who persuaded Gorbachev to undertake ideological reform. This was a fatal error!
However, to this day, I still cannot determine whether or not the CIA had a hand in it.
This is because Yakovlev spent a great deal of time working at the Soviet Embassy in Canada. Gorbachev, too, traveled there at Yakovlev’s invitation—long before he became president. Yakovlev arranged a meeting between Gorbachev and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau—presumably, the modern-day Trudeau is his son or grandson. While in Canada, Gorbachev also met with representatives from the United States. This took place in the early 1980s. It would be fascinating to know what exactly they discussed there. I do not rule out the possibility that Yakovlev was working for the CIA—perhaps even unwittingly.
As for China outmaneuvering the west, I agree. This is pretty plainly what happened, despite what the west thought they could get away with, China maintained a dictatorship of the proletariat and maintained political control in the socialist market economy.
Yes, I agree that retaining political control is to Mao’s credit, as he built the foundation of the state apparatus.
The Chinese CPC labeled Khrushchev’s rapprochement with the West as “Khrushchev’s revisionism.”
Some time later, Deng initiated a rapprochement with the West. The Chinese CPC called this “opening up.”
but to equate Khrushchev and Deng is to make a clear error.
Khrushchev was a pale, insignificant figure compared to Stalin—and likely compared to Mao, too.
Someone in China once said—I don’t recall the exact words or who said it—that Mao was the matador and Khrushchev the bull.
Comparing Mao and Khrushchev is indeed inappropriate—except, perhaps, regarding their education and experience in economic management. In every other respect, Mao was a far more significant figure. A characteristic trait of Khrushchev’s during the Stalin era was that he executed orders very well but never showed initiative. That is likely how Khrushchev differed from Mao; Khrushchev was a sycophant and a careerist.
For instance, during the purges, Khrushchev ranked second in terms of the number of people on the lists of suspects he submitted to Stalin for approval. He was zealous in his efforts to curry favor with Stalin.
And then he accused Stalin of the very thing he himself did better than anyone else… )))
It’s widely acknowledged that the later Mao era and the era of the Gang of Four was filled with mistakes, and that Reform & Opening Up was a course correction. You may call this “double standards,” but learning from mistakes when practice doesn’t live up to expectations is how we grow.
We’ve finally reached a consensus, Comrade! There’s just a slight discrepancy regarding the dates. You say the late Mao era began in 1968, whereas I maintain that the late Mao era you’re referring to actually began after Stalin’s death. Let me just clarify one more thing: from 1950 onwards—after suffering four strokes—Stalin didn’t really make any major decisions in the country. A triumvirate was formed—Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov—to prepare all key state projects, while Stalin merely affixed the final approval. So, in essence, Stalin had already died back in 1950.
If we settle on a middle ground… say, 1959—would that work for you, Comrade?.. ))))
Yes, of course I can explain.
As we know: The primary cause of the rift between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev lay in the policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist nations—a course Khrushchev proclaimed at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956. Mao Zedong viewed this policy as a departure from Marxism-Leninism and a betrayal of the global revolution, which led to deep ideological and geopolitical disagreements.
As we know: Deng adopted a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West in the 1970s…
Do you not see the contradiction here, Comrade? If that is the case, then China and the USSR ought to reconcile, since their policies are identical. As we recall, the 1970s saw a period of “détente” between the USSR and the USA.
Incidentally, it was when Khrushchev pivoted toward the West that the USSR became hooked on the “oil needle”—a dependency it still hasn’t managed to kick…
The monetary reform of 1961 was carried out in order to peg the ruble to the dollar.
I would be very surprised, Comrade, if you said otherwise.
I met a Chinese guy on Reddit whose father fled to the U.S. during the Cultural Revolution.
But it probably wasn’t any worse—because fewer people actually died during the Cultural Revolution; the events there consisted mostly of unprecedented repression.
I think the “Gang of Four” affair was Deng clearing his own path to power. The internal political struggle at the time was extremely fierce.
Did you see the news footage of that trial?
There was one woman among the defendants—I don’t recall her name, though she was a close associate of Mao—and for some reason, I felt sorry for her. When she delivered her final statement in court, it struck me that only a true communist facing execution could speak like that…
Let’s put it this way: China outmaneuvered the U.S. The U.S. underestimated China’s strength. This is what we have come to call the “Chinese Miracle.” Americans are pragmatists; they don’t believe in miracles… :))))
It is just like how the West slept on the USSR back in the 1930s… they, too, refused to believe in a miracle at the time.
However, I believe that comparing these two miracles is somewhat inappropriate. As you rightly noted, the conditions under which these goals were achieved were quite different.
I believe you are mistaken, comrade. I am not actually Nikita Khrushchev nor am I Mao Zedong. Any “double-standard” you see with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up as a result of problems with the late Mao era and the Gang of Four must be considered from that context, and not merely from one aspect of Mao’s critique of Khrushchev’s policy before the Gang of Four era.
Regarding the Gang of Four, they were largely an extension of Mao’s incorrect lines towards the end of his life, without most of his positive lines. Deng Xiaoping corrected the course for the new era of development, having inherited a basically industrialized economy but with widespread poverty and backwards technology.
As for China outmaneuvering the west, I agree. This is pretty plainly what happened, despite what the west thought they could get away with, China maintained a dictatorship of the proletariat and maintained political control in the socialist market economy.
You’ve probably misunderstood me again, Comrade.
What you call Deng Xiaoping’s “openness,” Mao called Khrushchev’s “revisionism.”
Deng did exactly what Khrushchev had attempted to do—only later. Or do you consider it a mistake on Mao’s part that he didn’t beat Khrushchev to the punch and establish relations with the West first?
I don’t understand why you—a man with the mindset of a dialectical materialist—are always prone to idealizing things. It is still a Party, and the same internal Party struggle is at play.
Let me tell you how it all unfolded in the USSR. When Gorbachev came to power and launched Perestroika, a great many members of the Central Committee were opposed to it. This was the so-called “Old Guard”—or, if you prefer, you could call them the “Gang of Four.” These were Brezhnev’s people. Within a very short timeframe—and very quietly—these individuals were either removed from their posts or sidelined for one reason or another; some were compromised and forced to step down. It wasn’t as loud, brutal, or theatrical as the affair involving the original “Gang of Four,” but the result was the same: the entire Old Guard—that “Gang of Four”—simply dissolved into the ether of existence…
To suggest that the “Great Helmsman” Deng was thinking about the people or about reforms back then—much as Gorbachev supposedly was during Perestroika while simultaneously purging his rivals—is, at the very least, naive, Comrade! At that time, they were thinking about one thing and one thing only: power.
And I recently told you something untrue. Gorbachev did have a plan. It was the “Acceleration” plan—a concept originally conceived by Andropov. Andropov had entrusted its development to three individuals: Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and… well, I’ve forgotten the third one. This “Acceleration” plan concerned exclusively economic reforms—there were absolutely no political or ideological components to it!
Over the course of two years—largely thanks to Ryzhkov—the plan was fully developed, and in 1985, Gorbachev officially launched it. He immediately presented it during the very first plenary session of the Central Committee. It was Andropov’s “Acceleration” plan.
It was a plan for economic reforms!
Then, in 1987—when Perestroika truly began (that is, when the term Perestroika first started appearing in the newspapers)—the scope of the reforms expanded to encompass not only economic matters but also state-level and ideological issues. Ryzhkov opposed this expansion and subsequently resigned. This comes from the memoirs of Ryzhkov himself, who passed away not long ago.
Yakovlev—who at the time served as the USSR’s chief ideologue—bears the entire blame. It was he who persuaded Gorbachev to undertake ideological reform. This was a fatal error!
However, to this day, I still cannot determine whether or not the CIA had a hand in it.
This is because Yakovlev spent a great deal of time working at the Soviet Embassy in Canada. Gorbachev, too, traveled there at Yakovlev’s invitation—long before he became president. Yakovlev arranged a meeting between Gorbachev and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau—presumably, the modern-day Trudeau is his son or grandson. While in Canada, Gorbachev also met with representatives from the United States. This took place in the early 1980s. It would be fascinating to know what exactly they discussed there. I do not rule out the possibility that Yakovlev was working for the CIA—perhaps even unwittingly.
Yes, I agree that retaining political control is to Mao’s credit, as he built the foundation of the state apparatus.
Deng did not do what Khrushchev did, for the following key reasons:
Deng upheld Stalin and Mao, refusing to create a historical nihilism among the people.
Deng did not state that class struggle was over, but instead that it was alive and well, and must be constantly watched out for.
Deng turned a largely backwards economy into a more progressive form, Khrushchev weakened a more advanced economy into a more regressive one.
I appreciate the added background detail for the Soviet perspective, but to equate Khrushchev and Deng is to make a clear error.
No, that’s not at all what I mean, Comrade!
I am talking about double standards:
The Chinese CPC labeled Khrushchev’s rapprochement with the West as “Khrushchev’s revisionism.”
Some time later, Deng initiated a rapprochement with the West. The Chinese CPC called this “opening up.”
Khrushchev was a pale, insignificant figure compared to Stalin—and likely compared to Mao, too.
Someone in China once said—I don’t recall the exact words or who said it—that Mao was the matador and Khrushchev the bull.
Comparing Mao and Khrushchev is indeed inappropriate—except, perhaps, regarding their education and experience in economic management. In every other respect, Mao was a far more significant figure. A characteristic trait of Khrushchev’s during the Stalin era was that he executed orders very well but never showed initiative. That is likely how Khrushchev differed from Mao; Khrushchev was a sycophant and a careerist.
For instance, during the purges, Khrushchev ranked second in terms of the number of people on the lists of suspects he submitted to Stalin for approval. He was zealous in his efforts to curry favor with Stalin.
And then he accused Stalin of the very thing he himself did better than anyone else… )))
It’s widely acknowledged that the later Mao era and the era of the Gang of Four was filled with mistakes, and that Reform & Opening Up was a course correction. You may call this “double standards,” but learning from mistakes when practice doesn’t live up to expectations is how we grow.
We’ve finally reached a consensus, Comrade! There’s just a slight discrepancy regarding the dates. You say the late Mao era began in 1968, whereas I maintain that the late Mao era you’re referring to actually began after Stalin’s death. Let me just clarify one more thing: from 1950 onwards—after suffering four strokes—Stalin didn’t really make any major decisions in the country. A triumvirate was formed—Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov—to prepare all key state projects, while Stalin merely affixed the final approval. So, in essence, Stalin had already died back in 1950.
If we settle on a middle ground… say, 1959—would that work for you, Comrade?.. ))))
I don’t think we are going to come to an agreement here. I wouldn’t put a hard date on it.
Comrade, just so you know: if I use “)))”, it means I’m joking.
Of course, one shouldn’t date events that way.
I wanted to highlight the fact that you agreed with me on at least one thing!)))